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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), despite being
considered one agency, serves two fundamentally different roles. The PTO
oversees both the registration of trademarks and the granting of patents.' Each
area is covered by its own distinct portion of the United States Code, trademarks
falling under Title 15, which deals with commerce, 2 and patents having their own
title, Tide 35.3
Along with being governed by different statutes, the two areas are subject to
different, though admittedly analogous, application and review procedures. The
nature of the inquiries involved in the two processes are, however, drastically
different. Trademarks are recognized to make it easier for the consuming public
to identify the source of particular products.4 The trademark application process
involves very fact-specific interpretations of the mark presented and a
determination of whether certain explicit statutory requirements are met.' An
applied-for mark can also be compared to registered marks to determine if there
is a likelihood that consumers would be confused as to some relationship between
the applied-for mark and registered ones.6 Such determinations are made solely
on the basis of appearance and require no specialized knowledge
Patents, also granted for the benefit of the public as a whole, are not actually
used by or even known to a large majority of the public. Patents involve
inventions and mechanical or scientific processes that the general public simply
would not comprehend or understand how to use. When a patent is applied for,
it must be compared to previous patents and the entirety of public knowledge,
referred to as the "prior art, ' to determine of whether it is useful, novel, and
non-obvious.9 These inquiries require some degree of scientific knowledge and
expertise.'
I See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); 35 U.S.C. 5§ 1-376 (2000).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1141 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
3 35 U.S.C. §2 1-376 (2000).
4 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000) (allowing for registration of marks "used in commerce" so as to
avoid confusion among consumers).
5 See id. § 1051 (a).
6 See id. § 1051(a)(3)(D).
7 See id § 1051 (requiring that applicant include drawing of mark); id. § 1052 (stating that no
trademark shall be denied registration unless its appearance meets certain statutory exemptions).
8 See, e.g., Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 63 (1923) ("In
administering the patent law, the court first looks into the art, to find what the real merit of the
alleged discovery or invention is, and whether it has advanced the art substantially.").
9 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000).
" See, e.g., Vitrionics Corp v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (describing patent
infringement analysis).
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WHAT'S THE DEFERENCE?
Decisions of the PTO involving both patents and trademarks may be appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or separate civil
actions may be brought challenging these decisions in federal district court." The
question these federal courts face is how much deference to give the decision of
the PTO on review. 2 Traditionally, the federal courts employed two levels of
deference when reviewing decisions made by the PTO: a court/court clearly
erroneous standard, and a court/agency standard derived from the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA).'3 In response to the confusion over which standard to
apply, the Supreme Court elected to grant certiorari in Dickinson v. Zurko,"4 and
held that a federal court should apply the court/agency APA standard, which calls
for the court to decide all relevant legal questions but defer to the agency's
findings of fact, 5 when reviewing decisions of the PTO.
16
Though Zurko was a case dealing with a patent, the court's decision used broad
language that could have substantial ramifications for trademark litigation. The
court stated that this new rule applied to review of all "findings of fact of the
PTO."' 7 Although the court did not limit application of this rule to review of
patents, the court did not explicitly state that it applied to trademarks.'" Thus, the
question of what level of deference a federal court reviewing a trademark decision
of the PTO should apply is still a valid one.
The purpose of this Note is to discuss the distinct histories of the trademark
and patent aspects of the PTO-including analysis of the Zurko decision-to
show that the Federal Circuit should apply the more strict court/court clearly
erroneous standard of review to trademark review decisions. The primary reason
for this proposed course of action is that none of the traditional reasons for
deferring to agency expertise are present with respect to the common sense nature
of trademark decisions.
, 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1) (2000); 35 U.S.C. §§ 141,145 (2000).
12 See, e.g., Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999) ("We must decide whether § 706 [of
the Administrative Procedures Act] applies when the Federal Circuit reviews findings of fact made
by the Patent and Trademark Office .....
13 Seeid at 153.
14 Id. at 154.
15 See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
16 Zurko, 527 U.S. at 165.
17 Id.
"5 See id. at 160-65 (neglecting to discuss whether rule set forth in Zurko applies to review of
review both patents and trademarks).
2007]
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II. THE DOUBLE LIFE OF THE PTO
A. TRADEMARKS
The Trademark Act of 1946, commonly referred to as the Lanham Act,19 was
enacted by Congress to reward investment in the marketplace and promote
competition, which ultimately lessens costs. for consumers.'0 Its enactment was
justified by the Constitutional grant to Congress of the power to regulate
commerce, both interstate and with foreign nations.2
A trademark is any source-identifying word or symbol-any means "by which
the goods of the [trademark owner] may be distinguished from the goods of
others."'  The Lanham Act provides that the owner of "a trademark used in
commerce" may apply for registration with the PTO.23 Implicit in this definition
of a registrable mark is the fact that the PTO can deny registration for a mark if
it is not "used in commerce., 24 This seemingly straightforward issue has become
ever more important in the midst of the information age and proliferation of new
technologies.25
The PTO can also deny registration to applicants' marks on other grounds.
Trademarks traditionally fall within one of four categories of distinctiveness:
generic, descriptive, suggestive, or arbitrary or fanciful.26 If a trademark "is one
which is commonly used as the name for a type of goods," then it is deemed
generic by the PTO and is not registrable.27 If the mark is descriptive, meaning
it only describes the underlying product rather than identifying the product's
19 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1141 (2000 & Supp. 1V 2004).
20 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003) ("Federal
trademark law.., by preventing competitors from copying 'a source-identifying mark,' 'reduces the
customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,' and 'helps assure a producer that
it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with
a desirable product.'" (citations omitted)).
21 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 ('The Congress shall have Power.... To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States .....
2 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2000).
Id § 1051 (a)(1).
24 See Larry Harmon Pictures Corp. v. Williams Rest. Corp., 929 F.2d 662 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(discussing what type of use meets the Lanham Act's "use in commerce" requirement for trademark
registration purposes).
' See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400,408 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing
the issue of what constitutes "use in commerce" for the purpose of trademark registration with
respect to website addresses).
26 See Horizon Mills Corp. v. QVC, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 208,211 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that
terms are divided into the four categories of generic, descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary or
fanciful).
27 Id.
[Vol. 15:173
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source, then the mark is not "inherently distinctive," and thus not registrable
without proof of secondary meaning.2" The existence of secondary meaning
implies that the trademark does in fact serve the traditional trademark function
of identifying the source to the consuming public.29 Similarly, if the trade dress,
or design, of a product is deemed to be merely functional and not source-
identifying, then the trade dress is not protectable under the Lanham Act.30
However, marks that are suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful can be registered
without a finding of secondary meaning because the use of such marks "ha[s] no
obvious connection with the [underlying] product."'" These types of marks have
been created by innovation and ingenuity on the part of the trademark owner
rather than by an attempt to hoard a common phrase for individual benefit.32
The PTO can also deny registration of a particular mark for a number of other
reasons, including if the mark is scandalous or otherwise in bad taste,33 deceptive
or misleading in any way,34 or if the registrant does not have priority to use the
mark in the applied-for area.3" The PTO's refusal of registration for any of the
above-mentioned reasons (or for any other reason provided for in the Lanham
Act)36 can be appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB).3' The
TrAB also has jurisdiction over opposition proceedings brought by a third party
who objects to the registration of a particular mark and files a notice of
opposition.3" Such a proceeding is not a full-fledged trial. 39
Appeals to the TTAB of PTO decisions come in one of two forms: ex parte
appeals and inter partes appeals. An ex parte appeal is one "done or made at the
instance and for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or argument
28 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992).
2 Id. at 766 n.4.
30 See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) (explaining
that trade dress protection does not extend to product features that are merely functional).
"1 CRAIG ALLEN NARD, DAVID W. BARNES & MICHAEL J. MADISON, THE LAW OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 21 (2006).
32 Id.
3 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2000).
Id x. § 1052(a), (e).
3Id. § 1052(d).
36 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2000) for a full list of reasons for which trademark registration may be
refused by the PTO.
11 15 U.S.C. § 1070 (2000) ("An appeal may be taken to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
from any final decision of the examiner in charge of the registration of marks. . .
38 Id. § 1063.
39 See EZ Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Cox Trailers, Inc., 746 F.2d 375, 377 (7th Cir. 1984)
("The T.T.A.B. is limited by statute to determining whether to grant or deny registration of a
trademark; it may not decide whether the use of a certain trademark violates the Lanham Act or
grant an injunction against an infringing use.").
2007]
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by, any person adversely interested."'  An example of such an appeal would be
where one party simply appeals the denial of a trademark registration. An inter
partes appeal is one involving two parties,41 such as when one party is granted
trademark registration and another party comes forward to oppose the
registration on proper grounds. Though there are obvious opportunities for
distinguishing between these two situations, for the purposes of this Note, all
appeals will be treated as equivalent. Any distinction between ex parte and inter
partes appeals is beyond the scope of this Note.
Under the Lanham Act, a party dissatisfied with a decision of the TTAB can
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.42
Alternatively, a party may appeal the TTAB's decision to a federal district court
of his choice.43 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) addresses the amount
of deference owed to decisions of administrative agencies by courts reviewing
those decisions and under what conditions reviewing courts can overrule or set
aside such agency action.' However, the APA is silent as to the amount of
deference owed such determinations in subsequent judicial proceedings that are
not direct appeals.4" In Chevron U.S.4., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
the Supreme Court set forth a high level of deference owed to administrative
agencies' interpretations of statutes with regard to rule making but neglected to
address the level of deference owed in quasi-judicial proceedings such as those
involved in the trademark registration process before the PTO and TTAB.46
Appeals from TTAB decisions are not the sole means by which a decision of
the PTO or TTAB can find its way into federal court. If a trademark owner
believes his trademark is being infringed upon under 15 U.S.C. § 1114, he can
bring a civil action in federal district court. 47 To bring a successful claim of
40 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 616 (8th ed. 2004).
41 I. at 836.
42 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (a)(1) (2000).
43 id.
' See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
45 Id.
46 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (discussing the rule for deference to administrative agencies with no
mention of the level of deference owed to quasi-judicial agencies). The Court stated:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation .... In such a case, a court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.
Id.
47 Id. According to the statute:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant use in commerce any
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark...
[Vol. 15:173
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trademark infringement, the plaintiff must prove three things: (1) that he has a
valid trademark, (2) that his use has priority over the defendant's use of that mark,
and (3) that the defendant's use of the mark would result in a likelihood of
confusion as to the origin of the defendant's product.' The first two elements
are factual issues that are relatively easy to prove one way or the other in most
infringement actions. The third element, likelihood of confusion, involves a more
complex balancing analysis and thus is typically the focus of trademark
infringement cases."'
In addition to providing protection to owners of federal trademark
registration, 5 1114 also protects owners of unregistered marks.50 Regardless of
whether a mark owner has failed to register a mark or had his registration for that
mark declined, he may still bring a suit against an alleged infringer."' If the mark
owner has simply failed to register the mark, this means that no PTO decision is
implicated in the suit, and the court has free reign to make whatever factual
determinations are necessary to resolve the conflict. If the mark owner has
applied for and been denied registration in the past, however, the court is faced
with a dilemma: how much deference should be given to the previous
determination of the PTO? With that said, regardless of how a PTO decision
comes before a federal court, the language of the Lanham Act implies that courts
do not owe PTO determinations absolute deference.5 2
in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion... shall be liable
in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(1)(a) (2000).
Id.
4s Id/
"' See, e.g., Jim Beam Brands Co. v. Beamish & Crawford Ltd., 937 F.2d 729, 732-33 (2d
Cir. 1991) (discussing each party's arguments on issue of likelihood of confusion between "Beamish"
and "Beam" marks).
'o See Sheldon W. Halpem, A High Likelihood of Confusion: Wal-Mart, Trafix, Moseley, and
Dastar-The Supreme Court's New Trademark Jurisprudence, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 237, 239 n.17
(2005) (" Trademark' rights may be asserted under [§ 1125(a)], in contradistinction to rights arising
from marks registered under... § 1051 (a).").
51 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992).
52 See 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (2000) ("In any action involving a registered mark the court may
determine the right to registration, order the cancellation of registrations, in whole or in part, restore
canceled registrations, and otherwise rectify the register with respect to the registrations of any party
to the action. Decrees and orders shall be certified by the court to the Director, who shall make
appropriate entry upon the records of the Patent and Trademark Office, and shall be controlled
thereby.").
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B. PATENTS
Although Congress must rely on its power to regulate commerce to justify
enacting regulations for trademarks, the Constitution grants Congress the explicit
power to regulate the issuance of patents.5 3
The Patent Act appears in Title 35 of the United States Code. 4 Patents
generally are divided into three categories: utility patents, design patents, and
plant patents.5" Once an inventor is granted a patent for his invention, he
acquires not a positive right to use his invention but rather a negative right, i.e.,
the right to exclude others from using that invention without his permission. 6
Certain subject matters are not patentable under the Patent Act. Section 101
of Title 35 describes those things which are patentable as "any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof... ."'- Though these subjects are fairly general and do not
provide explicit bounds for what is and is not patentable, courts have recognized
that there are certain subjects which are not patentable, namely laws of nature,"8
a "scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it,'' 59 and abstract ideas."
For an invention to be considered for a patent by the PTO, the patent
application must contain two key components: a written description of the
invention and claims.6 The written description must contain "the manner and
process of making and using [the invention], in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains ... to make
and use" the invention.62 The underlying policy behind this requirement is that
if other inventors are to be restricted from using a certain invention, they should
be put on notice as to what exactly they are prohibited from doing.63 One
important requirement of the written description, commonly referred to as the
13 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power "to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
14 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000).
55 NARD ETAL., supra note 31, at 652. Any such distinctions are beyond the scope of this Note.
5- See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) ("Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and
a grant to the patentee.., of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or
selling the invention .... ').
17 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
s Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 598 (1978).
s Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939).
0 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
61 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
62 Id.
63 NARDETAL., suranote 31, at 653 (explaining that the written description serves to "delineate
the patent owner's property right').
[Vol. 15:173
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"enablement" requirement,64 is that the written description must enable someone
skilled in the art to make and use the invention.6' To further this end, in addition
to the enablement requirement, a patent application must contain "the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention, 66 and a series of
claims setting out exactly what the "applicant regards as his invention."67 These
claims can be free-standing, termed "independent" by the Patent Act, or can build
off of previous claims, termed "dependent" claims. 6 The written description and
claims are often accompanied by a drawing to further describe the claimed
invention and help fulfill the enablement requirement.
69
If a patent application is denied, the applicant may apply for a reexamination
of the application and is free to amend the application to address any of the
concerns leading to the denial of the original application.70 If the patent
application is again rejected by the PTO, the applicant may then appeal that
decision to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI),7' the patent
equivalent of the TTAB. As with TTAB decisions, if a party is not satisfied with
the outcome of a BPAI decision, that party may appeal to the Federal Circuit72 or
bring a civil action to obtain the patent against the Director of the PTO in a
federal district court.73 After a patent has been granted, if a third party wishes to
challenge the decision of the BPAI in a reexamination proceeding, whether it be
on the grounds that the enablement or utility requirements are not met, or that
the invention is not novel in light of the prior art,7" that party can also appeal that
decision to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.7"
If, upon examination of a patent application, the PTO decides that the
applicant's invention would infringe any existing patent or any invention for
which a patent application is pending, it may instigate an interference in the BPAI
under 35 U.S.C. § 135. 7" Both interested parties, the applicant and the patent-
holder (or conflicting applicant, whichever the case may be), are given notice, and
the BPAI then makes any determinations regarding priority and patentability
' See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2924 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
65 35 U.S.C. 5 112 (2000).
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. 113.
70 Id 132(a).
71 Id. 1 34(a).
72 Id. § 141.
73 Id. 145.
74 Id. 302.
75 Id. 141.
76 Id. 135.
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necessary to settle the dispute.7 A party dissatisfied with the outcome of an
interference may appeal the decision of the BPAI to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit under § 141 .7' Alternatively, under § 146 the adversely affected
party can bring a civil action against the other party in federal district court within
sixty days of the interference decision.79
If, after a patent is granted, a third party believes the patent at issue interferes
with a previous patent, then that party can bring a civil action against the applicant
under § 291.80 In this type of action, "the court may adjudge the question of the
validity of any of the interfering patents, in whole or in part."81 Such an action is
treated the same as if it had been instigated as an appeal by one of the parties to
an interference under 5 146.s
C. THE TWO LIVES OF THE PTO
The United States Patent and Trademark Office was created under the Patent
Act and is granted the power to both issue patents and register trademarks.83
Despite its two vastly different functions, the PTO is viewed as a single
administrative agency within the Department of Commerce." Congress did make
clear, however, that "those operations designed to grant and issue patents and
those operations which are designed to facilitate the registration of trademarks
shall be treated as separate operating units within the [PTO]."5
The fact that the two spheres in which the PTO operates are truly distinct is
further evidenced by the differing procedures it employs in evaluating patent and
trademark applications. For a trademark application, the PTO only reviews the
applied-for trademark and makes relatively simple value judgments on the validity
of the mark (such as whether the mark generic, descriptive, fanciful, etc.).s6 In
determining whether there is confusing similarity, the PTO and the TTAB
evaluate the appearance of the marks together with their respective uses in
77 Id
78 Id. § 141.
79 Id. § 146.
80 Id § 291.
81 Id.
82 Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 146 (2000).
83 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
8' See id § 1(a) (stating that the PTO "shall be subject to the policy direction of the Secretary of
Commerce").
85 Id
' See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
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commerce.87 Such a determination is based upon the evidence presented by the
parties and does not require technical expertise on the part of the decisionmaker.88
In the patent context, however, the PTO makes relatively complex judgments
about the invention, comparing it to prior art to determine if the applicant's
invention is useful, novel, and non-obvious.89 This involves careful consideration
of the prior art and close inspection of the invention's functionality and design.9"
The PTO must evaluate a significant amount of extraneous evidence in its
evaluation of a patent application.9
Thus, while in trademark cases the PTO and TTAB are making relatively
simple determinations requiring little to no expertise, the PTO and BPAI in
patent cases are making complex, informed determinations drawing heavily upon
the agency's expertise in the patent area. This is not a situation where two
categories of proceedings are simply being handled in roughly the same way, but
rather a case where two completely separate types of proceedings involve
drastically different processes. Patent determinations require expertise and at least
a rudimentary understanding of the underlying scientific concepts, while
trademark decisions can be made without any expert knowledge.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
There are two traditional standards of review that are relevant when discussing
the amount of deference owed to determinations of the PTO, TTAB, and BPAI.
The first is the traditional "clearly erroneous" standard, sometimes termed
court/court review, which applies in instances of judicial review of lower court
findings of fact.92 Given that the TTAB and BPAI hear reviews of PTO decisions
in a quasi-judicial environment, this would seem like a viable standard to apply.
However, because the PTO and its subsidiaries are administrative agencies set up
by congressional statute, the standard generally applied in court review of agency
findings could be applied as well.93 This court/agency standard, set out in the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),94 is a stricter standard of review than the
87 See In re E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
88 See id (stating that the likelihood of confusion must be determined based on the facts in
evidence and listing thirteen factors that can be taken into account).
89 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000).
90 Id. 103.
9' See 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2000) (requiring patent application be compared to the prior art in order
to determine novelty and non-obviousness).
92 FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153 (1999).
91 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
94 See infra Part III.B.
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court/court standard and could potentially lead to different results in factually
similar cases.95
A. COURT/COURT REVIEW'
The clearly erroneous, court/court standard of review originates in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (F.R.C.P.).96 F.R.C.P. 52(a) states that "[f]indings of
fact... shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." 97 The Supreme Court
clarified the clearly erroneous standard in UnitedStates v. United States Gpsum Co.,9"
explaining that "[a] finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence
to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."99 In a later case, the
Supreme Court further clarified that the clearly erroneous standard "plainly does
not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply
because it is convinced that it would have decided the case differently."'1 This
means that as long as the lower court had some evidence to support its finding,
an appellate court should defer to that finding. It is a necessary corollary to this
rule that where there is evidence on both sides leaving the trial judge with two
possible interpretations of the evidence, the trial judge's decision cannot be clearly
erroneous.
10 1
The Supreme Court has articulated several policy reasons for the application
of the clearly erroneous standard when reviewing lower court findings. One key
reason is a practical one: the trial judge actually has the facts before him and
therefore is in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses and the
amount of credence to give the various pieces of evidence.1 0 2 Furthermore, by
consistently serving as a finder of fact on a case-by-case basis, the trial judge
develops a facility with that function that an appellate judge does not possess.0 3
In this way, the very nature of the trial judge's role as trier of fact lends support
to the proposition that reviewing judges, not well-versed in the art of sifting
95 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000); Zurko, 527 U.S. at 152-53.
96 Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Zurko, 527 U.S. at 153.
' Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
98 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
9 Id. at 395.
100 Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985).
101 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 341-42 (1949).
102 See Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982) (noting that F.R.C.P. 52(a)
recognizes "the unique opportunity afforded the trial court judge to evaluate the credibility of
witnesses and to weigh the evidence").
10 Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574 ("[W]ith experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise.").
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through evidence or the underlying details of that process, should defer to the
trial judge's findings.
Another rationale for applying the clearly erroneous standard is to lessen the
burden of litigation on the parties involved. As the Supreme Court explained in
Anderson, "parties to a case on appeal have already been forced to concentrate
their energies and resources on persuading the trial judge that their, account of the
facts is the correct one; requiring them to persuade three more judges at the
appellate level is requiring too much."'" Therefore the basic structure of the
federal court system and the nature of the trial judge's role at the lower level
dictates that deference be given to the trial judge's findings in order to promote
the efficient operation of the judicial system.
B. COURT/AGENCY REVIEW AND THE APA
Congress enacted the APA in 1946 "in part to bring uniformity to judicial
review of administrative action."15 The APA was also enacted to respond to
complaints of inequitable agency action coupled with a reluctance of the courts
to adequately fulfill their role of judicial oversight."° Under the APA, a court
reviewing a decision of an administrative agency decides all relevant legal
questions, but defers to the agency's findings of fact."0 7 Two standards are set out
for reviewing the findings of fact of administrative agencies. When an agency
makes factual findings in either an informal setting, or where a hearing is not
required to be "on the record,"'0 8 findings of fact can be overturned if they are
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
the law."'' However, if a finding is made in a formal setting, such as an appeal
of a PTO decision to the TTAB or BPAI, more deference is given to the agency's
determination and any finding of fact can be overturned only if "unsupported by
substantial evidence."110
4 Id. at 575.
100 Jeffrey C. Metzcar,-A Problematic Pat on the Backfortbe PTO: Dickinson v. Zurko, 50 CASEW.
RES. L. REV. 797, 798 (2000).
" Christian A. Chu, Dickinson v. Zurko, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 209, 209 (2000) (quoting
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 479 (1951)).
107 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
0 Chu, supra note 106, at 210.
9 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
110 Id. § 706(2)(E).
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IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PTO DECISIONS
Before discussing what level of deference shouldbe given when PTO decisions
are appealed to a federal court, it is helpful to first review the amount of deference
courts have previously given in trademark and patent cases. Federal courts
approach judicial review of trademark and patent cases similarly. However, while
treatment of patent cases has been fairly consistent, uncertainty is the rule of the
day when it comes to reviewing trademark decisions of the TTAB.
A. JUDICIAL REVIEW GENERALLY
In appeals of TTAB and BPAI decisions brought to the Federal Circuit under
15 U.S.C. § 1071(a) or 35 U.S.C. § 141, respectively, new evidence is not
allowed."' Interestingly, before Zurko, the Federal Circuit consistently utilized a
court/court standard of review in such cases." 2 Appeals brought under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1071(b) and 35 U.S.C. 5 145, which allow additional evidence to be brought,' 3
have not received the same consistency of treatment.
Although often characterized as trials de novo," 4 appeals of TTAB and BPAI
decisions in district courts differ markedly from true trials de novo. Traditionally,
a trial de novo is "a new trial on the entire case-that is, on both questions of fact
and issues of law-conducted as if there had been no trial in the first instance."'1
An appeal to a district court of a decision of the BPAI or TTAB differs from the
typical trial de novo in two key ways. First, while the district court reviews the
administrative record with respect to those issues brought before the PTO, it may
consider additional evidence regrading issues not raised in the prior administrative
111 5 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4) (2000) ("W[The Federal Circuit shall review the decision from which the
appeal is taken on the record before the Patent and Trademark Office."); 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2000).
See aLo Laurence P. Colton & Nigamnarayan Acharya, IntellectualProperty, 55 MERCER L. REv. 1327,
1338 n.106 (2004) ("Review under 35 U.S.C. § 145 is distinct from a 35 U.S.C. § 141 appeal in that
it affords the applicant an opportunity to present additional evidence.").
112 See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("We believe section 559 of the
Administrative Procedure Act permits, and stare decisis warrants, our continued application of the
clearly erroneous standard in our review of these fact-findings.').
113 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (b)(3) (2000) (noting that further cross examination of witnesses is permitted
and that the admission of the record in the PTO office does not prevent either party in the litigation
from taking further testimony); 35 U.S.C. § 145 (2000). See also Colton & Acharya, supra note 111.
114 Monsanto Co. v. Kamp, 269 F. Supp. 818, 822 (D.D.C. 1967) (noting that appeals against the
Commissioner of Patents and appeals of priority decisions made by the Board of Patent
Interferences to a district court "are sometimes denominated 'trials de novo,' but... [p]roceedings in
this Court in actions of these two types are not true or genuine trials de novo').
115 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1544 (8th ed. 2004).
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proceeding." 6 Despite the allowance of new evidentiary material, some equitable
limitations are placed on the admission of new evidence.' 17 The second difference
between a trial de novo and a review of a decision of the TTAB or BPAI is that
the "burden is on the party challenging the administrative ruling to demonstrate
that it was erroneous, ' as opposed to a true trial de novo where both parties
begin again on equal footing.
B. TRADEMARKS IN FEDERAL COURT
When a registered trademark owner finds himself in a federal court
proceeding, many courts hold that the PTO and/or TTAB's grant of the
registration is not dispositive of factual or legal issues but merely provides the
plaintiffwith a presumption ofvalidity of his trademark in infringement actions."'
According to the Tenth Circuit, "[m]ost courts.., hold that the [PTO's] decision
to register a mark without requiring proof of secondary meaning creates a
rebuttable presumption that the mark is suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful rather
than merely descriptive."' 2 ° The Tenth Circuit accepted the Fourth Circuit's
reasoning PizjZeria Uno Cotp. v. Templ' 2 as justification for applying this
standard.'22 In PiZeria Uno, the Fourth Circuit explained that in order to find
marks suggestive or descriptive on a consistent basis, "it is especially prudent 'to
give due respect to the determination of the [PTO].' ,1a The PiZZeria Uno court
further explained that a decision of the PTO must be considered presumptively
correct by a reviewing court.124
"' Monsanto Co., 269 F. Supp. at 822.
... See, e.g., id (stating that "[s]uch evidence as was available to the parties, but was withheld from
the Patent Office as a result of fraud, bad faith, or gross negligence, may be excluded at the trial"
(citations omitted)); Aqua-Chem, Inc. v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 1970 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11382,
at *3 (D. Ill. June 10, 1970 and Sept. 28, 1970) (holding that "a party may not deliberately withhold
evidence from the [BPA1] and then present it to a court when dissatisfied with the Board's
decision").
'1s Monsanto Co., 269 F. Supp. at 822.
See, e.g., Liquid Controls Corp. v. Liquid Control Corp., 802 F.2d 934, 936 (7th Cit. 1986)
("[Registration] entitles the plaintiff to a presumption that its registered trademark is not merely
descriptive or generic, or, if merely descriptive, is accorded secondary meaning.').
120 GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 538 (10th Cit. 1990).
121 747 F.2d 1522 (4th Cit. 1984).
122 GTE Cop., 904 F.2d at 538-39.
123 747 F.2d at 1528 (quoting Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 379 (7th
Cit. 1976)).
124 Id. at 1529; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1057(h) (2000) ("A certificate of registration of a mark.., shall
be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of
the registrant's ownership of the mark, and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered
mark in commerce.").
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In EZ Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Cox Trailers, Inc.,121 the Seventh Circuit went
in the opposite direction by electing to give the PTO's decision little deference,
holding that "[t]he registration of a trademark does not confer upon that mark a
presumption of non-descriptiveness.' ' 6 Although EZ Loader was a trademark
infringement suit, the issue was not about whether that mark was descriptive,
suggestive, or arbitrary, but rather whether there was a likelihood of confusion
between a registered mark and an unregistered mark. 27 The court affirmed the
district court's grant of the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
theory of collateral estoppel. 121 In the underlying case, the district court had
applied collateral estoppel to the Federal Circuit's. affirmation of the TTAB's
finding that there was no likelihood of confusion between the two marks. 29
C. PATENTS IN FEDERAL COURT
In the early case of Morgan v. Daniels, the Supreme Court showed a great deal
of deference the PTO's findings in priority disputes, stating that:
where the question decided in the Patent Office is one between
contesting parties as to priority of invention, the decision there
made must be accepted as controlling upon that question of fact in any
subsequent suit between the same parties, unless the contrary is
established by testimony which in character and amount carries
thorough conviction.' 3°
The Federal Circuit has held this "thorough conviction" standard to be roughly
equivalent to the clearly erroneous standard.' 3 ' In order to overturn a lower
court's decision as clearly erroneous, a reviewing court must be "left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' 32 The Court
then concluded that, because it could discern no substantive difference between
"thorough conviction" and "definite and firm conviction," it would apply the
clearly erroneous standard in all actions brought under § 145, though it noted that
this standard may be changed somewhat by the use of any additional evidence.'
33
125 746 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1984).
126 Id. at 379.
1"7 Id. at 376.
128 Id at 381.
129 EZ Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Cox Trailers, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. IlL. 1983).
130 153 U.S. 120, 125 (1894) (emphasis added).
131 Fregeau v. Mossinghoff, 776 F.2d 1034, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
132 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
133 Id.
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D. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Collateral estoppel, which was used to dispose of the EZ Loader case, is a
common method for taking advantage of previous PTO determinations."3 Under
the doctrine of collateral estoppel, commonly referred to as issue preclusion, a
party attempts to use the determination of an issue in a previous lawsuit as
binding on a subsequent lawsuit. 135 There are three elements that must be present
in order to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel: (1) a valid and binding
judgment on the merits, (2) the issue was actually litigated, and (3) the
determination was essential to the judgment.'3 6 Despite the outcome in EZ
Loader and the widespread attempts to apply collateral estoppel to PTO findings,
courts have been reluctant to apply the doctrine in the context of likelihood of
confusion determinations.'37 A common justification for not applying collateral
estoppel in these situations is that the inquiry into likelihood of confusion before
the PTO and TTAB is narrower than the inquiry in trademark infringement
actions.'
38
The Second Circuit had the opportunity to address a multitude of issues
involving the amount of deference owed to the PTO's factual determinations in
Jim Beam Brands Co. v. Beamish & Crauford Lid.,'"3 including an attempt to use
collateral estoppel. Plaintiff Jim Beam, a popular producer of various alcoholic
beverages, owned trademark registrations for "BEAM," "BEAM'S," and "JIM
BEAM."' 4 ° The defendant later obtained registration for its own mark,
"BEAMISH," for use in connection with sales of its beer.'4' The plaintiff
petitioned the TTAB to cancel the defendant's registration on the basis that it was
134 See Levy v. Kosher Overseers Assoc. of America, Inc., 104 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 1997); Jim Beam
Brands Co. v. Beamish & Crawford Ltd., 937 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1991); EZ Loader Boat Trailers, Inc.
v. Cox Trailers, Inc., 746 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1984); Tonka Corp. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 836 F.
Supp. 200 (D.N.J. 1993).
135 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 279 (8th ed. 2004).
'" See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,326 (1979) ("Under the doctrine of collateral
estoppel ... the second action is upon a different cause of action and the judgment in the prior suit
precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first action.");
Lawlor v. Nat'l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955).
3' See Jim Beam, 937 F.2d at 734-36; EZ Loader, 746 F.2d at 377-79; Legy, 104 F.3d at 41-43;
Tonka, 836 F. Supp. at 211-12.
13' Leg, 104 F.3d at 41.
139 937 F.2d 729 (1991).
'4o Id. at 731.
141 id
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likely to cause confusion with the plaintiff's previously registered marks.'42 The
TTAB found in the defendant's favor.'43
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit noted that factual
findings of the TI'AB should only be overturned if clearly erroneous.'A Although
the court admitted that the TTAB's findings were not clearly erroneous in this
case, the court reversed the TTAB's decision anyway and canceled the defendant's
registration, holding that likelihood of confusion was a legal matter for the
reviewing court to determine.
141
Subsequently, Jim Beam brought a trademark infringement action against
Beamish under § 11 14(1)(a) of the Lanham Act."4 The district court held that
because likelihood of confusion had been found by the Federal Circuit, the
doctrine of collateral estoppel applied, and the finding of likelihood of confusion
was binding upon the district court. 41 In reversing the district court's decision,
the Second Circuit held that a likelihood of confusion determination in the
context of trademark infringement was a different standard from likelihood of
confusion in the context of trademark registration.'" The inquiry in the former
situation revolves solely around the appearance of the marks, 4 9 while in the latter
situation the focus is not simply the appearance but also the context in which the
marks are used.' ° Because the issue of likelihood of confusion was not identical
in both situations, the Second Circuit concluded that collateral estoppel did not
apply. '5 The court did not, however, foreclose the possibility of collateral
estoppel ever applying in this particular situation.'52
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 id
145 Id. at 731-32.
'46 Id. at 732.
147 Id. at 733.
148 Id. at 735.
149 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2000) ("No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration ... unless it... so resembles a
mark registered ... as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant,
to cause confusion .... D.
150 Jim Beam, 937 F.2d at 734-35. See also 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(1) (a) (covering situations in which the
infringing mark is used "in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of
any goods or services on or in connection with which such use").
155 937 F.2d at 735.
152 See id (distinguishing cases in which "the Board had actual#y decided the issue of likelihood of
confusion of the marks in context" (emphasis added)).
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V. ZURKO
The Supreme Court faced the issue of how much deference to give PTO
decisions in Dickinson v. Zurko.5 3 In that case, the Supreme Court had to decided
how much deference to give findings of fact of the PTO when directly reviewing
those decisions.' The Court granted certiorari after the Federal Circuit, en banc,
had held that the clearly erroneous standard was the appropriate standard of
review.'5
5
A. THE CASE
Before Zurko reached the Supreme Court, the Commissioner of the PTO had
argued for the Federal Circuit to review factual findings of the PTO using the
more deferential substantial evidence standard of the APA rather than the stricter
clearly erroneous standard.5 6 Though the PTO is clearly an administrative agency
for the purposes of the APA, there are exceptions to the application of the Act's
standard of review. The Act explicitly provides that it "[does] not limit or repeal
additional requirements imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law.
s157
The Federal Circuit noted that it had been firmly established in previous Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) (the predecessor of the TTAB and BPAI)
decisions that the applicable standard of review was one of the court/court,
clearly erroneous variety.'
5 8
In Zurko, the Federal Circuit relied on two main sources to support its
decision: the legislative history of the APA5 9 and the principle of stare decisis. 6 °
According to the court, the legislative history provided both general and specific
support for maintaining the clearly erroneous standard of review.16' The court
noted that the Attorney General's Manual on the APA stated that the APA
c'generally leaves the mechanics of judicial review to be governed by other
statutes and by judicial rules.' "'62 In terms of judicial review, the Attorney
General's Manual stated that the APA " 'was drafted to restate rather than alter
153 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
l-4 Id. at 152.
155 Id. at 153-54.
156 In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
157 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2000).
158 In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1457.
159 Id. at 1450-52.
160 Id. at 1457-59.
161 Id. at 1451-52.
162 Id. at 1451 (quoting Att'y Gen.'s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 9 (1947)).
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existing, established standards.' ,,163 Moreover, the court concluded that the
legislative history indicated that judicial review of PTO decisions was intended to
be exempt from any standard of review set out in the APA. 164 . The court
described Congress's intent that the APA apply to agencies generally, but went on
to say that Congress intended an exception for substantive PTO decisions based
on existing common law standards and the availability of trial de novo under 35
U.S.C. § 145.165
The Federal Circuit explained that under the doctrine of stare decisis, courts
should not significantly alter well-established practices absent a substantial
reason. 166 Furthermore, in the realm of statutory construction the principle of
stare decisis has "special force" because Congress has the power to legislate
specifically on a subject if dissatisfied with the judiciary's interpretation of
legislation.16 Recognizing that the reasoning of prior decisions may nevertheless
become outdated, the Federal Circuit emphasized that "[t]he [clearly erroneous]
standard has not become a doctrinal anachronism, nor have the premises
underlying it changed to make it irrelevant or unjustifiable-it is very much alive
and in use throughout the legal system.' 161 The Supreme Court then elected to
grant certiorari to determine the appropriate standard to apply when reviewing
TTAB decisions.' 69
The Zurko Court began its analysis by examining the Federal Circuit's view
that in appeals of PTO decisions in the CCPA, a clearly erroneous court/court
standard was applied prior to the adoption of the APA in 1946.170 The Court
disagreed with the Federal Circuit's analysis.'7 ' Although the Court could find
neither a court/court nor a court/agency standard explicitly stated in these pre-
APA cases, there was some consistency in the language used to describe the
applicable standards.'72 Many of the cases used phrases such as "clear case of
error," "clearly wrong," or "manifest error."' 73  The Federal Circuit had
interpreted this language as indicating a clearly erroneous court/court review
standard, but the Supreme Court held that this interpretation was misplaced.'74
163 Id.
"64 Id. (citing several statements in the APA legislative history explicitly exempting review of PTO
decisions from the APA's standard of review).
165 Id. at 1452.
166 Id. at 1457.
167 Id. (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989)).
168 Id. at 1458.
169 Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999).
170 Id.
171 Id. at 155.
172 Id. at 154-55.
173 Id. at 155.
174 Id. at 158-61.
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The Federal Circuit based its interpretation of the CCPA decisions on a
Supreme Court case from the late nineteenth. century, Morgan v. Daniels.7 1 In
reviewing a decision of the PTO, the Morgan Court emphasized that "this is
something more than a mere appeal. It is an application to the court to set aside
the action of one of the executive departments of the government' '176 The Court
in the case went on to say that when parties have contested the priority of their
respective inventions before the PTO, there is a presumption in favor of the
PTO's decision with respect to that question of fact in a subsequent suit between
the same parties unless clear testimony to the contrary is established.
177
Therefore, if the resolution of a question of fact about priority of invention is
supported by evidence from both sides and thus open to the PTO's discretion,
then the court owes deference to that decision.1
7 8
Upon close inspection of the CCPA cases, the Supreme Court in Zurko found
fault with the Federal Circuit's analysis. The Court noted that many of the
decisions emphasized the PTO's technical expertise in explaining why the PTO
was better qualified than a federal court to make certain decisions in the patent
context.179 According to the Court, though the words "manifest error" and
"clearly wrong" are more closely akin to the less deferential clearly erroneous,
court/court standard, these terms were used "to explain why [the CCPA] g[ave]
so much, not so little, deference to agency factfmding."' 8 ° The Court, staying
faithful to the spirit of the Morgan decision, held that when reviewing a finding of
fact by the PTO, the Federal Circuit should apply the normal federal court
standard of review for agency decisions under the APA.'5 '
Zurko was not a unanimous decision, however. In his dissent, Chief Justice
Rehnquist said he "would defer, not to agencies in general as the Court does
today, but to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the specialized Article
III court charged with review of patent appeals."' 2 Both the patent bar and the
Federal Circuit had interpreted previous CCPA cases as applying the stricter
clearly erroneous standard of review to PTO decisions.'83 According to Justice
17 In re Zurko, 142 F.3 1147,1453--54 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120,
125 (1894)).
176 Morgan, 153 U.S. at 124.
177 Id. at 125.
178 Id. (stating that the decision of the PTO must control because the question of priority of
invention was doubtful).
179 Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 160 (1999).
180 Id.
181 Id. at 154; see also Hope Hamilton, Note, Parsing the Standard of Review Purzk: How Much
Deference Should Federal District Courts Afford Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Decisions?, 12 FED. CIR.
B.J. 489, 496 (2003) (describing Zurko holding).
18 Zurko, 527 U.S. at 171 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
183 Id.; see also In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ('We believe section 559 of the
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Rehnquist, because the intent behind the APA was to raise the minimum
standards in order to bring uniformity to judicial review of agency actions,
lowering the standard of review from the previous clearly erroneous standard to
the less strict court/agency standard would be inconsistent with the purposes of
the Act.84 In Rehnquist's view, the court/court standard had been clearly
established and would constitute an " 'additional requirement... recognized by
law,'" thus providing an exception to court/agency standard of review described
in the APA."'8
B. TRADEMARKS AND ZURKO
Neither Zurko nor the CCPA cases relied upon by the Supreme Court in Zurko
were trademark infringement suits but rather were all patent infringement cases."6
While the Lanham Act does provide for judicial review of PTO decisions, it never
explicitly states the appropriate standard of review that should be applied in
trademark cases.'87
Given that (1) the PTO handles both patent and trademark applications, (2)
the Supreme Court in Zurko did not explicitly limit its holding to the patent
context, and (3) new evidence is allowed in appeals to district courts that is not
permitted in appeals to the Federal Circuit, several interesting issues arise. One
district court hearing an appeal from a TAB decision denying trademark
registration applied the APA court/agency standard of review in a case in which
no new evidence was presented.' 8 The Federal Circuit, citing Zurko, has held that
it is required to apply the APA standard of review to factual determinations in the
trademark context as well.'89 Though Zurko involved a patent and a decision of
the BPAI, the Federal Circuit noted that "[n]othing in these statutes suggests that
the TTAB should receive any less deference on factfinding than the BPAI."'190 In
CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng'& Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that district courts
hearing appeals under 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b) should apply the APA standard of
[APA] permits, and stare d dsiswarrants, our continued application of the clearly erroneous standard
in our review of these fact-findings.").
184 Zurko, 527 U.S. at 171 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
18 Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2000)).
s Id. at 155 ('The 89 pre-APA cases all involve CCPA review of a PTO administrative decision,
which either denied a patent or awarded priority to one of several competing [inventors].').
187 See 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (2000) (explaining what a court may do in terms of overturning PTO
trademark decisions, but not how the court is to go about doing it).
188 Glendale Int'l Corp. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 374 F. Supp. 2d 479, 485 (E.D.
Va. 2005).
189 On-Line Careline, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1084-85 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
190 Id. at 1085.
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review to TTAB decisions. 191 The Seventh Circuit noted that although the district
court did not explicitly adopt the APA standard in reviewing the TTAB's findings
of fact, it had "applied that standard in substance.'
'192
Application of Zurko and the APA standard of review even in the patent
setting has not been universal. The District of Massachusetts refused to apply the
court/agency standard when reviewing a decision of the BPAI because the
Supreme Court in Zurko did not explicitly focus on the standard of review a
district court should apply to factual findings of the PTO under 35 U.S.C.§ 145.193 The First Circuit did not hear this case on appeal, so it is unclear
whether the circuit would endorse the District of Massachusetts's interpretation
of Zurko or whether this decision would simply be an anomaly.
Of the eleven circuit courts of appeals, only the Seventh Circuit has addressed
the issue of which standard of review to apply in the trademark context, choosing
to follow the APA standard in accordance with Zurko. 94 The question has only
directly come up in one other circuit, with a district court in the Ninth Circuit
siding with the Zurko court. 5 A district court in the Fourth Circuit, though not
expressly referring to the Zurko standard, has applied a "substantial evidence"
standard. 6 The opinion in this case later cites Zurko when discussing the
implications of the different standards.'97 Other courts have used the phrase
"substantial evidence" to indicate the APA, court/agency standard of review set
out in Zurko.'
9 8
VI. WHICH STANDARD SHOULD BE APPLIED IN THE
TRADEMARK CONTEXT?
A. WHAT STANDARD HAVE THE COURTS ACTUALLY APPLIED?
The uncertainty as to what standard should be applied by courts reviewing
PTO trademark decisions was most readily demonstrated by the Seventh Circuit's
191 267 F.3d 660, 676 (7th Cir. 2001).
192 id.
193 U.S. Filter Corp. v. Ionics, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 48, 52 (D. Mass. 1999).
194 See ChanAir, 267 F.3d 660,676 (7th Cit. 2001) ("[We must determine whether... the district
court's review of the TTAB's decision was consistent with ZurkoY.).
19' Carefree Trading, Inc. v. Life Corp., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1113-14 (D. Ariz. 2000).
196 Glendale Int'l Corp. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 374 F. Supp. 2d 479, 485 (E.D. Va.
2005).
197 Id
198 See, e.g., Chen v Bouchard, 347 F.3d 1299, 1301 (Fed. Cit. 2003) ("Because the Board's
decision was supported by substantial evidence and not contrary to law, and its evidentiary rulings
do not reflect an abuse of discretion, we affirm.").
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decision in EZ Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Cox Trailers, Inc."99 There, the court held
that registration of a mark did not provide the registrant with a presumption that
the mark was non-descriptive.2° However, to support this assertion, the court
misapplied previous Seventh Circuit holdings. In Chicago Reader, Inc. v. Metro
College Publishing Co., the Seventh Circuit held that while the word "READER"
was descriptive, the plaintiff was "entitled to continued trademark protection for
its particular design of 'Reader,' " which it had registered as a trademark.2"'
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Telemed Corp. v. Tel-Med Inc. held that the term
"Telemed" should be protected "only when it appears in the distinctive 'optical
font' typestyle" of the mark for which the plaintiff had received registration. 2
In both cases, the court essentially reached the same conclusion: registration
of a word in a stylized design does not render the underlying word non-
descriptive but rather provides the mark owner with the presumption that the
mark itself is protectable. The EZ Loader court, however, described the holdings
in these cases as standing for the proposition that "the registration of a trademark
does not confer upon that mark a presumption of non-descriptiveness. 2 °3 The
EZ Loader court wrongly concluded that a determination that an underlying word
is descriptive is the same as a finding that the mark itself is descriptive. Though
a subtle difference, this is a difference nonetheless. It is important to note that
while the Telemedand Chicago Readercourts found the underlyingwords descriptive
in both cases, they did not overturn the PTO's grantings of registration. In fact,
the courts in both cases deferred to the PTO's decision to register the marks and
never questioned the validity of the registration of the actual mark.2"
The Seventh Circuit in EZ Loader also overlooked the fact that, in the
underlying case, the Federal Circuit consciously demonstrated a great deal of
deference when directly reviewing a TTAB decision. The Federal Circuit noted
that in close cases involving undisputed facts, "the ultimate decision on likelihood
of confusion necessarily involves a substantial degree of subjectivity," and the
court deferred to the TTAB's judgment on the issue.2 °s
199 746 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1984).
200 Id. at 379.
201 711 F.2d 801, 804 (7th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
202 588 F.2d 213, 219-:20 (7th Cir. 1978).
203 EZ Loader, 746 F.2d at 379.
204 See Tekmed, 588 F.2d at 215, 220; Chicago Reader, 711 F.2d at 804.
"0 EZ Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Cox Trailers, Inc., 706 F.2d 1213, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In
support of its decision, the court referenced Witco Chemical Co. v. Whiield Chemical Co., which noted
that
[i]t is, after all, a matter of judgment and appellant's position is, fundamentally,
that the board exercised a wrong judgment, not that it was in any way mistaken
about the law or the important facts. We are not disposed to overturn the
unanimous judgment of the board in a case such as this one where judgments
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The approach endorsed by the Federal Circuit, showing deference to the
TTAB's interpretation of the evidence, is essentially a court/agency standard of
review. The Seventh Circuit in EZ Loader, in contrast, claimed to follow a less
deferential approach more akin to a court/court standard. Ironically, despite
declaring that PTO decisions warranted little deference, the Seventh Circuit in EZ
Loader disposed of the case based on the Federal Circuit's decision, which had
given a ITAB finding a tremendous amount of deference.
Further muddying the waters is the Jim Beam case. The court there was
addressing the effect of a ruling not of the PTO or TTAB but rather of the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which was directly reviewing the ruling of the
TrAB. Unlike its showing of great deal of deference to the TTAB finding in EZ
Loader, the Federal Circuit in Jim Beam endorsed a clearly erroneous standard of
review for factual findings of the TTAB.2° The Federal Circuit showed little
deference to the previous finding of likelihood of confusion and essentially
confronted the issue anew. Interestingly enough, the Second Circuit showed the
Federal Circuit a similar level of faux-deference, espousing the necessity of
deference, while nevertheless fashioning a means of overturning the ruling
anyway.
B. COURT/COURT VS. COURT/AGENCY: DOES IT MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
The difference between the court/court standard of review and the
court/agency standard "is a subtle one-so fine that ... [there is not] a single
instance in which a reviewing court conceded that use of one standard rather than
the other would in fact have produced a different outcome."2 "7 But that does not
mean that every difference between the two standards is completely meaningless.
The application of the two standards seems to indicate that a reviewing court may
review agency action based on its own reasoning under the clearly erroneous
standard, while under the APA standard the reviewing court is confined to
reviewing the decision based on the reasoning of the agency.2 "
While the issue of deference to PTO decisions in the trademark context is not
so completely unsettled in the wake of Zurko to be considered a problematic split
among the circuits, future litigation could enhance the uncertainty already present.
Parties dissatisfied with the decisions of the TTAB might choose, to the extent
may differ but in which it appears to have done a careful job and where there is
substantial support in the record for what it has done.
Witco Chem. Co. v. Whitfield Chem. Co., 418 F.2d 1403, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
2' See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
2" Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153 (1999).
' See Sue Ann Mota, Dickinson v. Zurko: Limits on the Federal Circuit's Standard of Review, 1999
CoMP. L. REV. & TECH.J. 23, 26-27 (1999).
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possible, to bring appeals in districts or circuits that choose to follow the less
deferential court/agency standard. This would ultimately clog up federal district
courts with cases which the Federal Circuit was created to handle.
C. THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD
Despite the fact that title 35 of the United States Code is entitled "Patents,"
the sections dealing with the creation of the PTO refer to both the patent and
trademark functions of that office." 9 Because this section appears in Part III of
Title 35, which is entitled "Patents and Protection of Patent Rights," and deals
exclusively with the patent aspect of the PTO,210 it arguably has no relevance in
the trademark context. However, because the PTO was established to deal with
both patents and trademarks, and because clear distinctions are made between the
two contexts throughout the code, the holding in Zurko and the opinion's broad
language could be read to imply that the court/agency standard as set forth in the
APA should be applied across the board to all PTO determinations."' Moreover,
there is also an overwhelming desire for uniformity in terms of review of actions
of administrative agencies,"' which makes applying one standard to all PTO
decisions seem like a logical choice.
So how much deference should the Federal Circuit and federal district courts
hearing trademark appeals give to determinations of the TTAB? Ultimately, the
reviewing court would have three options: (1) show TTAB decisions absolute
deference, (2) show TTAB decisions no deference whatsoever and review all
evidence de novo, or (3) show TTAB decisions some intermediate level of
deference.
If courts showed decisions of the TTAB absolute deference, this would
essentially eliminate the purpose of allowing a review in the first place. Only
when new evidence is submitted would the reviewing court have any
responsibility besides rubber-stamping the decision of the TT'AB. The fact that
the Federal Circuit is hearing the appeal implies that it should exercise at least
See 35 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
210 Id §§ 100-318.
211 See Zurko, 527 U.S. at 160 (noting that out of the eighty-nine CCPA cases reviewed by the
Zurko court, the CCPA gave much deference to the PTO fact-finding because of the PTO's
expertise in the technically complex subject matter and because in many of the cases, several PTO
tribunals had reviewed the subject matter and agreed on the factual findings). According to the
Zurko court, "[t]hese reasons are reasons that courts and commentators have long invoked to justify
deference to agen~yfacfinding." Id. (emphasis added).
212 Id. at 154 ("Recognizing the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial review
of administrative action, we have closely examined the Federal Circuit's claim for an exception to
that uniformity." (citation omitted)).
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some minimal amount of scrutiny or else the review would be a mere formality
and an utter waste of judicial resources.
Because of the confusion and inconsistency surrounding judicial review of
PTO findings coupled with the amount of subjectivity involved in the
court/agency review standard, some may argue that complete de novo review
would be the appropriate option. In fact, section 1119 of the Lanham Act
explicitly allows reviewing courts to overturn TTAB findings and enter orders to
the Director of the TTAB.21 3 Thus, it could be argued that this language actually
is the applicable rule;214 however, this provision is not frequently followed by
courts.
215
Numerous arguments can be made for the practicality of de novo review. For
one thing, very few TTAB decisions ever find their way into a court for review in
the first place. 216 The dearth of trademark cases in federal cases in federal court
suggests that the TTAB continues to be the preferred forum for settling
trademark disputes due to its apparent efficiency when compared to federal
courts. TTAB resolution of a trademark dispute is less expensive and much
quicker than a federal court due to its stripped-down procedures.2 17 Another
possible advantage to the de novo/no deference rule would be the incentive it
imposes on the TTAB to perform its review functions more thoroughly in order
to have those decisions stand up.15 This argument, however, glosses over one
very important consideration: the purpose of having administrative agencies in
the first place. Some detractors argue that by delegating authority to
administrative agencies, Congress is relinquishing its responsibility to decide key
political questions, waving the white flag in the face of making difficult
decisions. 219  This, however, is a gross mischaracterization of the situation.
213 See 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (2000).
214 See Hamilton, supra note 181, at 514 ("The Lanham Act expressly provides that courts shall
have all of the same rights as the TTAB, and in fact ...even though courts have historically
recognized the expertise of the TTAB and its examiners, one could argue that the Lanham Act
affords district courts the right to operate fully independent of the agency's findings.").
215 Id. at 515 ("No federal district court has ever concluded that an appeal under § 21(b) of the
Lanham Act should be absolute de novo-some have come close, but in the end, all agree that
agency findings are entitled to some weight.'.
216 See id. at 514 n.154 ("During the year 2000, there were only sixty-five ex parte appeals and
thirty-seven inter-partes appeals from the USPTO to the Federal Circuit.") (citing 2000 USPTO
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 36, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
com/annual/2000/OOfitigation.pdo.
217 See 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (2000) (detailing the procedures to be followed in PTO proceedings).
218 See Hamilton, supra note 181, at 514 ("[1]f all federal judges review TTAB findings with great
scrutiny, giving less outright deference, the TrAB will have an incentive to conduct better fact
finding, and issue more thorough opinions to avoid embarrassing reversals.").
219 See Harold J. Krent, Book Notes, Delegation and Its Discontents: Power Without Responsibih60, 94
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Congress's reliance on administrative agencies arose out of "a practical
understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing
and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability
to delegate power under broad general directives."" It would be impossible for
Congress to function if it were forced to engage in legislating and rule-making at
the level of detail necessary to have any practical effect in every area in which rules
are currently propagated by various administrative agencies.
In a similar vein, quasi-judicial entities along the lines of the PTO and the
TrAB were created to make complex, fact-specific determinations.22' The PTO
review process is intended to be a cheap and expedient means of dealing with the
question of compliance with the requirements of the Lanham Act without
clogging the federal courts.' Yet the Act still provides for federal court review
in situations where a party believes the 'ITAB's decision was not the correct
one.2 This places a check on the threat of arbitrary decisions while keeping the
federal courts free of the ordinarily clear-cut decisions that the PTO and T-AB
generally face.
If every finding of the PTO or TfAB were subject to de novo review by a
federal court, this would encourage every party receiving an adverse decision to
appeal to either the Federal Circuit or a federal district court in hopes that judges
less knowledgeable and experienced in the subject matter would see things
differently. Not only would such a standard of review go against considerations
of judicial economy, but it would also eliminate any real sense of finality to PTO
decisions. Further, this standard would effectively render the PTO superfluous:
if every PTO decision were reviewable de novo in federal court, then the agency
findings in essence would be meaningless, and thus the PTO would serve no
practical purpose.
The structure of our current administrative state depends on giving
administrative agencies some amount of authority and deferring at least in part to
their rules and decisions, including factual findings of the PTO and TrAB. The
COLUM. L. REV. 710, 714 (1994) (reviewing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT
RESPONSIBILITY (1993))..
o Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). The court went on to emphasize that
"'[i]n an increasingly complex society Congress obviously could not perform its functions if it were
obliged to find all the facts subsidiary to the basic conclusions which support the defined legislative
policy.'" Id (quoting Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm'r of Wage & Hour Div. of Dep't of Labor,
312 U.S. 126, 145 (1941)).
221 See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 619-23 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(noting that a specialized commission may be better able to make complex technical determinations
than Congress).
m See Hamilton, supra note 181, at 514 (stating that T1AB's "purpose" is as "the primary
screener of trademark registrability").
m15 U.S.C. § 1119 (2000).
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key question that must be answered is how much deference to TTAB decisions
is warranted in trademark disputes? There. are two obvious options for the
Federal Circuit to choose between in terms of how much deference to show
TTAB decisions: the court/court clearly erroneous standard or the court/agency
arbitrary or capricious standard. It might seem obvious, absent an explicit
statutory explication of the appropriate standard of review, that the logical choice
is the court/agency standard as set out by the Supreme Court in Zurko. 24
Although Zurko and the cases discussed by the Supreme Court in that decision all
involved patents, the broad language used could be read as applying to both
patent and trademark decisions of the PTO and TTAB. However, despite how
simple this issue appears on its surface, a clearly erroneous standard would in fact
be the smarter choice.
The BPAI is generally made up of members with law degrees and technical
expertise in one of several scientific disciplines." 5 This scientific expertise is used
to make educated judgments as to the characteristics of the applicant's invention
and previous inventions with which the applicant's invention is being compared.
In situations such as these, the reason for deferring to agency decisions becomes
quite clear. The members of the BPAI are required to have a scientific
background because it is necessary for many of the decisions they make. When
an appeal comes to a federal court, the judges reviewing the case probably will not
have any real scientific background at all, at least not to the extent necessary to
make such decisions. Therefore, substantial deference should be given to the
BPAI in light of the expertise of its members, and courts should not be permitted
to easily overturn such decisions.
Members of the TTAB, however, are not called upon tomake determinations
as complex and technical as those made by the BPAI. In fact, when the ITAB
is faced with a decision regarding the registrability of an applied-for mark, the
main focus is on how the general public would view that mark: whether it is
descriptive, fanciful, obscene, or likely to be confused with another mark
presently used in commerce. Such determinations require no extraordinary skill
outside of the ability to make objective value judgments, which any judge serving
on a federal court presumably possesses. It makes no sense to afford members
of the TTAB more deference than that afforded lower court judges, who are
arguably more qualified to make such determinations given their position. There
2 Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
See 33 U.S.C. § 6 (2000) ("The administrative patent judges shall be persons of competent legal
knowledge and scientific ability.... "); DennisJ. Harney, The ObviousNeedforDefrence: FederalCircuit
Remew of Patent and Trademark Office Determinations of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 28 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 61, 65 (2002).
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is no real countervailing interest in deferring to agency expertise in situations
where no such expertise is truly exercised.
Aside from this practical rationale, there is also a further public interest
realized when applying the stricter clearly erroneous standard to 7TAB decisions.
If members of the TTAB know they are to be scrutinized more thoroughly upon
review, they will be more likely to make careful inspections of the evidence before
them and more specific and in-depth findings in the interest of not having those
findings overturned."6 Such improved inquiry at the ITAB level "could have the
effect of freeing up the federal courts and streamlining judicial efficiency.""
VII. CONCLUSION
While applying the traditional APA standard of judicial review of
administrative agencies to PTO decisions involving patents is logical given the
technical expertise required to make such a determination, it makes no sense in
the context of trademark decisions. When faced with a trademark issue, the PTO
is not uniquely situated to solve the problem. No specialized knowledge is relied
upon to make such a decision. The examiner merely looks at the evidence before
him and makes a decision based on his best judgment. Providing such decisions
more deference than that given to similarly made decisions in lower courts
frustrates the purposes of judicial review and ignores the justifications for
providing agency decisions a different standard of review in the first place. In
light of these considerations, a stricter clearly erroneous standard would be the
logical standard to apply in the trademark context.
However, though Zurko was a patent case and thus arguably inapplicable to
trademark suits in federal courts, the opinion's broad language could be (and in
some cases has been) interpreted to require the more deferential APA standard
to trademark as well as patent cases. The Supreme Court's failure to clearly
articulate the breadth of Zurko's holding has left open the question of what the
appropriate standard should be. Because of the small number of trademark
decisions that are appealed, and the supposed improbability of the choice of
review actually making a difference in a particular case, there may not be enough
impetus to settle the issue. But holes in the law such as these are always
troublesome. Until Congress or the Supreme Court directly addresses the issue,
the standard of review in the trademark context will remain an open question.
Jonathan S. Digby
226 See Hamilton, supra note 181, at 514 n.156 (noting that the Supreme Court "was not
convinced" of this argument in Zurko, which was a patent case).
22' Id. at 514.
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